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10 November 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[redacted]  
Chairman, DCI Committee on Hostile Intelligence  
Threat Analysis

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SUBJECT: DCI Committee on Hostile Intelligence Threat Analysis

The HITAC was created by letter from the DDCI dated 12 August 1983. The Committee met first on 24 August 1983 and has held a total of four meetings with the last being held on 7 October 1983. Subsequent to the last meeting, a final HITAC report was prepared, coordinated with Committee members, and furnished to you as well as to the DCI Advisory Commission on Counterintelligence Analysis under the chairmanship of [redacted]. The Committee's report contained the recommendation that the HITAC be organized as a permanent Intelligence Community Committee to serve as a point of coordination for analytical matters. [redacted]

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The HITAC contemplates no additional meetings until approval is received for the proposal contained in the final Committee report. At such time, the Committee would again become active by addressing issues raised in a much more in-depth matter than was permissible during the initial meetings due to restriction of time. [redacted]

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The future of the HITAC at this point is at the discretion of the DCI and no activity is anticipated pending action to the HITAC final report. [redacted]

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## R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

1. The Hostile Intelligence Threat Analysis Committee, or a similar group, should be institutionalized.

- Chaired by the FBI
- Supported by the CCIS
- Functions
  - Broker requests for MD and CI analysis that have not been satisfied by Departmental production agencies
  - Point of contact for the NSC, supra-Departmental groups, Congressional intelligence committees and others without organic CI analytical support
  - With CCIS assistance, determine needs of counter-measure community
  - Review overall production for gaps, studies needing updates and the distribution of effort among the various CI/security topics
  - Resolve issues between CI production agencies
  - Establish general criteria for prioritizing production

2. Resources to enhance the FCI program's analytical capability should continue to receive strong DCI and Departmental support to implement ongoing and new initiatives.

- DCI "Law" Guidance and DoD FDYP for FY 85 budget will have an adverse impact on programmed manning levels and need to bring ADP support on line.

3. To increase relevancy, usefulness and usability of production, agencies should

- Conduct periodic consumer surveys including in-depth interviews to establish requirements and solicit feedback
- More fully source information to avoid pitfall of "false confirmation"

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- Minimize restrictive distribution caveats and sanitize information from sensitive sources to increase potential consumership
- List production in National Register to maximum extent consistent with compartmentation requirements
- Develop controls to ensure scheduled production is published
- Develop criteria to prioritize production within individual Departments and to identify potential consumers of MD analyses
  - Review balance between terrorism and Hostile intelligence production
  - Review balance between raw data collection and finished production